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PREVENTING HOMELESSNESS: RENT CONTROL
OR RENT ASSISTANCE?
PATRICK J. CARTY*
This White Center symposium on Homelessness' marks
the tenth anniversary of a most un-American American phe-
nomenon: the new homeless.2 In the past, significant increases
in the homeless population have tended to coincide with major
recessions. Yet today's homeless epidemic is a spiteful irony
reminding us that a particular underclass has risen in step with
an overall level of material prosperity unprecedented in our
nation's history. Estimates of the homeless population range
from three hundred and fifty thousand to three million.3 More
important than determining the exact number of homeless,
however, is an understanding of this group's diverse configura-
tion. Several demographic groups comprise the homeless, sug-
gesting that more than one cause contributes to the problem.
Solutions targeting one subgroup, therefore, mitigate just part
of the overall problem. Practical necessity demands, however,
* B.A. 1987, Fordham University; J.D. 1990, University of Notre
Dame; Thos.J. White Scholar, 1988-90. I would like to dedicate this student
article to Eileen T. Carty, a giving mother and a courageous single-parent.
1. The Homeless Assistance Act defines a homeless person as:
(1) an individual who lacks a fixed regular, and adequate
nighttime residence; and
(2) an individual who has a primary nighttime residence that
is-
(A) a supervised publicly or privately operated shelter
designed to provide temporary living accommodations
(including welfare hotels, congregate shelters, and transitional
housing for the mentally ill);
(B) an institution that provides a temporary residence for
individuals intended to be institutionalized; or
(C) a public or private place not designed for, or ordinarily
used as, a regular sleeping accommodation for human beings.
Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11302(a) (West Supp. 1989).
2. Callaghan v. Carey, 188 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 4
(consent decree filed with N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 1979), began a decade of
serious litigation on behalf of the homeless. During this time, the
demographics of the homeless population have changed significantly. The
author uses the term "new homeless" to 'capture the rapid demographic
changes in the homeless population during this past decade.
3. Lam & Wright, Homelessness and the Low-income Housing Supply, Soc.
POL'v, Spring 1987, at 48.
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that this student article focus on only one subgroup of the
homeless. Consequently, this student article will address the
effectiveness of rent control and rental assistance in preventing
homelessness for single-parent, female-headed households.
4
Currently, the majority of marginalized, low-income fami-
lies obtain their housing from rentals.5 Accordingly, this stu-
dent article will focus on the rental housing market and more
specifically, two initiatives with significant, consequences for
low-income families. The first is rent control6 and the second
is rental assistance.7 Part I will discuss the central values
underlying both rent control and rental assistance.
Part II will discuss rent control. Rent control is essentially
a locally based political solution to rising rents as diverse in
application as the communities that enact it. Rent control
attempts to solve the problem of inflationary rents by imposing
artificial and often arbitrary ceilings on the market rent. Such
controls no doubt give great short-term relief to those tenants
fortunate enough to occupy a controlled unit but this student
article contends that such ordinances are not specifically tai-
lored to help the marginally homeless. Part II, therefore, dis-
cusses to what extent rent controls hinder or assist the low-
income population's quest for affordable housing.
Part III discusses a second initiative with major implica-
tions for the low-income population, namely, federally funded
rental assistance.' Like rent control, rental assistance exists in
4. A review of the statistics justifies the emphasis on female-headed,
single-parent families. From 1950 to 1980, family households grew by
slightly more than half, but female-headed households almost tripled.
Moreover, in comparison to other American households, female households
are poor with a median income in 1980 that was less than half of the national
figure. Birch, Women and Shelter: Needs and Issues, in HOUSING ISSUES OF THE
1990s (S. Rosenberry & C. Hartman eds. 1989).
5. A. DOWNS, RENTAL HOUSING IN THE 1980s 21 (1983). In this student
article, the term marginalized refers to those groups of low-income families
who become homeless for economic reasons. To be marginalized, therefore,
is to be at a severe competitive disadvantage in the rental housing market.
6. Rent control is also referred to as rent regulation, rent stabilization,
price control and also rent restriction. While differences among the
individual terms exist, for the purposes of this student article, rent control
will be used in its broadest sense to include all these variations provided they
allude to the same phenomena of government intervention to restrain prices
of rent.
7. Rental assistance is also commonly known as rent certificates, rent
supplements, rent subsidies, housing allowances and housing vouchers.
8. For thorough discussions of the theories behind and the practice of
rental assistance see generally R. STRUV & M. BENDICK, HOUSING VOUCHERS
FOR THE POOR (1981); J. FRIEDMAN & D. WEINBERG, THE ECONOMICS OF
PREVENTING HOMELESSNESS
many forms. Unlike rent control, however, rental assistance is
a federal program. Part III discusses the component parts of
both proposed and existing rental assistance programs, evalu-
ating each from the perspective of which is most beneficial to
the low-income tenant.
This student article approaches the problem of homeless-
ness from the perspective of preventing it.9 At each stage of
the analysis the central question is "What are the most effective
and reasonable means of preventing homelessness for low-
income families?" A rational discussion, normative analysis
and qualitative judgment of both rent control and rental assist-
ance will significantly contribute to the aim of preventing
homelessness, because it will develop the problem solving
aspect of public policy that is needed in this troubled area.
This student article does not create an artificial tension
between rent control and rent assistance, only then to come
down in favor of rent assistance. Rather, it is recognized that
designing measures to alleviate homelessness necessarily
entails focusing on the rental housing market because it is the
primary market for the poor. One third of households in the
United States are renters and a strong majority of the poor
dwell in such housing.' Therefore, this student article pro-
ceeds from the assumption that sound policies for preventing a
family's drift into homelessness will emanate from a study of
the rental housing market and the two public policy initiatives
in this area.
I. VALUES UNDERLYING THE RENT CONTROL/RENTAL
ASSISTANCE DEBATE
Ideally, when formulating public policy, two questions
should be considered, What is the policy's objective? and How
might planners best achieve that objective? The first question
is largely one of ideology-prioritizing values. In a democratic
HOUSING VOUCHERS (1982); I. LOWRY, EXPERIMENTING WITH HOUSING
ALLOWANCES (1983).
9. The main focus of this student article is a discussion of rent control
and rent assistance from the perspective of measuring their potential for or
effectiveness in preventing homelessness. Consequently, this student article
will not address the obvious question of whether a right to housing exists at
all. For a discussion of whether a right to housing exists see Appelbaum, A
Progressive Housing ProgramforAmerica, in HOUSING ISSUES OF THE 1990S, supra
note 4, at 313-31; C.F. LISTOKIN, FAIR SHARE HOUSING ALLOCATION (1976)
(which discusses the doctrine of fair share enunciated by New Jersey courts
and implicitly advances the notion of a right to housing).
10. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1985 STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS TABLE 1242
(1989); A. DOWNS, supra note 5, at vii, 21.
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society, public policy thrives when centered on a consensus of
values," because the policy takes root in and is supported by a
public that understands and affirms the goal of the policy.
Only those values sufficiently important enough to be deemed
societal values could then anchor public policy. If the first
question addresses the problem of priority, then the second
question should only be technical. Unfortunately, reality and
the decision-making process are not as straightforward. For
one, goals and means are not so neatly distinguishable from
values. Values not only determine the goal of policy, but its
implementation as well. Rent control and rental assistance are
excellent cases in point.
A. Values Underlying Rent Control
Identifying the values underlying rent control is relatively
easy in comparison to measuring the policy's effectiveness.
Two values are readily identified: first, rent control directly
alleviates rent burden'" and thus reduces hardship. Second,
rent control prevents rent gouging where it may exist and thus
promotes equity. The real reasons for which local political
leaders enact rent controls are known only to them. Perhaps
an ordinance is nothing more than the recognition that tenants
and not landlords, possess more political strength in a given
community, otherwise known as the brute force method of
enacting legislation. Or perhaps a particular ordinance reflects
a bold political initiative to alleviate the problem of rent bur-
den. Touting rent control as a valuable policy for assisting low-
income families obtain affordable housing has a certain com-
mon sense appeal. Moreover, the policy undoubtedly works
for the tenants fortunate enough to occupy a controlled unit.
Because scholars currently define the low-income housing cri-
sis in terms of affordability, rent control has common sense
appeal as a solution because, for some, it directly reduces rent
burden.
11. For a discussion of the role of consensus in public policy see J.
MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS (1960). For an excellent and succinct
discussion of the role that values and ideology play in shaping public policy
see R. HAYS, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND URBAN HOUSING: IDEOLOGY AND
CHANGE IN PUBLIC POLICY 1-15 (1985).
12. Rent burden is the measurement by which housing analysts
monitor the degree of shelter poverty. Shelter poverty defines the condition
of those persons who cut their spending on basic necessities such as food and
clothing in order to meet the inflexible necessity of shelter costs. Typically,
those low-income families who spend beyond 20 to 30 percent of their
income on rent are shelter poor. Stone, Shelter Poverty in Boston: Problem and
Program in HOUSING ISSUES OF THE 1990s supra note 4, at 337-39.
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With the practical effectiveness of rent control proven, why
is it that no federal statute exists? The answer lies within the
nature of rent control. First, the effectiveness of rent control
for reducing rent burden for all or most low-income families is
hotly debated. Also, there is a concern for fairness. Those who
accept that the affordability of low-income housing is a national
concern ought to be troubled by the fact that only landlords are
asked to shoulder the burden of alleviating the problem. "
Such demands are fundamentally unfair 4 because price reduc-
tion for some low-income families at the expense of the owners
who rent to them is not necessarily an equitable approach to a
societal problem. The wisdom of rent control as the primary
vehicle for attacking the problem of affordability also faces the
problem of being an anomalous solution in terms of our
nation's economic history.
Rent control rests on an almost cynical distrust of the mar-
ket. Yet, the market system of production is deeply embedded
in our nation's history. Although housing is a highly regulated
area, the production of rental housing in this country has been
left primarily to the marketplace.' 5 Nevertheless, government
activity has been conspicuous and significant.' 6 Rent control,
despite exemptions for new construction, could threaten the
market's ability to produce new rental units available to low-
income tenants.' 7 Rental assistance, on the otherhand, does
not threaten market production. In fact, rental assistance could
13. Kristof, The Effects of Rent Control and Rent Stabilization in New York
City, in RENT CONTROL, MYTHS AND REALITIES 126 (W. Block & E. Olsen eds.
1981).
14. The Supreme Court has continuously upheld the constitutionality
of rent control, on fairness grounds, most recently in Pennell v. City of San
Jose, 813 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1120 (1988). Because the
Court declined to address the takings issues, some commentators see this
issue as potentially a successful challenge to rent regulation. See Salins,
Reflections on Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 775, 776-77 n.10 (1989).
15. A. DOWNS, supra note 5, at 19. For a discussion of the possibilities
of socializing the production and distribution of housing see Appelbaum, supra
note 9, at 313-21.
16. While the government may not be a major player in the production
arena, this is not to suggest that government is a minor player in the housing
industry. Rather, the government's position, at the federal, state and local
level is very significant. For instance, tax laws, housing codes, rent controls
and zoning ordinances show the range of possible ways that government
plays a significant role in the housing industry.
17. See infra notes 38 & 39 and accompanying text.
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enhance market production, at least in theory, by increasing
effective demand. 8
From the second practical effectiveness of rent control,
combatting rent-gouging, one can distill the value of equality.
Rent control is certainly effective in this regard, but political
leaders should be aware that any attempt to reduce rent-goug-
ing should address three important concerns. First, the degree
to which rent-gouging exists in the given political entity. Sec-
ond, whether rent control could be tailored in such a fashion
that it could "surgically" attack rent-gouging without penaliz-
ing honest landlords attempting to earn modest returns on
their investments. And third, whether rent-gouging, to the
extent that it exists, actually effects the low-income population.
Without addressing these concerns before drafting legislation,
rent control advocates run the very real risk of enacting the
wrong type of legislation for a community that would otherwise
benefit from a well-honed rent control ordinance. A poorly
drafted rent control ordinance would run the risk of dampen-
ing new construction and potentially causing disinvestment and
eventual decay through lack of maintenance. Just as those who
cultivate a diverse garden understand that success in the final
outcome comes from individual attention to the differing needs
of various plants, so must legislators understand that not all
residential rentals will thrive or even survive under an ordi-
nance that is uniformly, and therefore indiscriminately,
applied.
B. Values Underlying Rental Assistance
Rental assistance promotes two important values that are
central to American political and economic history: liberty and
efficiency.' 9 Rental assistance allows individual families a
greater choice of where to live by enhancing their buying
power.20 John Stuart Mill said that "If it were only that people
have diversity of taste, that is reason enough for not attempting
to shape them after one model."'" Rent control does not give
people a choice. Rather, it tends to lock people into neighbor-
18. See infra note 61.
19. The notion of efficiency as a value is taken from Cooter, The Best
Right Laws: Value Foundations of the Economic Analysis of Law 64 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 817 (1989).
20. One should note that while rental assistance alone allows recipients
greater choice than they would have otherwise, this is subject to the
participation of landlords.
21. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 83 (R. Blackwell ed. 1946).
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hoods. 22 Rental assistance goes beyond the more important
goal of housing low-income people by allowing them the
opportunity to move out of less safe neighborhoods. Maintain-
ing a roof over the heads of a single-parent, low-income family
in a safer neighborhood furthers another important societal
value-family stability. Whereas rent control has a tendency to
lock people in, rental assistance has the potential to give poor
families greater freedom. By increasing a participant's freedom
of choice, rental assistance reduces the problem of affordability
thereby facilitating the ability of low-income families to com-
pete in an already competitive rental housing market.
As well increasing an individual's ability to choose, rental
assistance promotes efficiency. Efficiency is a value underlying
public policy in the sense that few publicly advocate wasting
money.23 From the perspective of how best to allocate tax-
payer dollars, one may find support for rent control as a means
of fighting the problem of low-income housing affordability.
After all, it is not taxpayers but landlords who pay for rent con-
trol. But others argue very strongly that rent control is waste-
ful, inefficient and very harmful to the property tax base in the
long-run.24 In response to the popular appeal of rent control,
these critics would assert that rent control causes society, as
well as landlords, to pay a real cost in terms of negative conse-
quences for the property tax base, quality and quantity of the
rental housing stock and tenant mobility.
The debate over the efficiency of rental assistance as a
means of alleviating rent burden pales in comparison to rent
control. 25 As will be discussed further, rental assistance is a
national solution to a national problem; rent control represents
a pot luck political initiative with only hit or miss application to
low-income families.
II. RENT CONTROL
Generally, rent control is any government intervention in
the rental housing market to regulate rent. Communities
began introducing rent controls in this country immediately
22. Note, All in the Family: Succession Rights and Rent Stabilized Apartments,
53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 213, 215 (1987).
23. Cooter, supra note 19, at 821.
24. See infra note 40.
25. The debate over the efficacy of rent control is far from settled. For
a favorable treatment of rent control see J. GILDERBLOOM & R. APPELBAUM,
RETHINKING RENTAL HOUSING (1988); but see RENT CONTROL, MYTHS AND
REALITIES, supra note 13. For a more balanced discussion of the issues see
generally P. NIEBANCK, THE RENT CONTROL DEBATE (1985).
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after World War I, when a massive influx of returning troops
strained their rental markets, causing prices to shoot upward.26
Subsequent controls, up until World War II and its aftermath,
were typically enacted under conditions of a housing "emer-
gency." 27 These earlier controls are commonly called "first
generation" and are usually more restrictive and more violative
of the market by making rents relatively inflexible to changes in
demand or operating costs.
The so-called "second generation" rent control ordi-
nances attempted to come to grips with serious problems of
restrictive controls. 2s A leading reason for reform of rent con-
trol legislation over the years was a recognition by lawmakers
that strict rent controls led to owner disinvestment and subse-
quent abandonment. What follows is a brief discussion of each
generation in turn, concluding with an assessment of rent con-
trol as a strategy for helping low-income tenants.
A. The First Generation Controls
A central feature of the first generation controls was the
emergency justification for enacting them.29 For example, the
rent control statute enacted in New York in 1946 was typical of
its generation. 30 To the extent that an emergency justification
underlay those ordinances, the lawmakers understood them as
short-term, stop-gap measures to deal with the shortage of
rental housing. 3' Although the 1946 ordinance was initially
thought to be temporary, New York City has been under vari-
ous forms of rent control continually since 1946. Critics
argued that by keeping prices artificially low and therefore
26. M. LETr, RENT CONTROL 1 (1976).
27. Id. at 4. Emergency is usually defined as a vacancy rate at or below
5%. Vacancy rates are reflective of the number of apartments for rent in a
given geographical location.
28. See Gupta & Rea, Second Generation Rent Control Ordinances: A
Quantitative Comparison, 19 URB. ArF. Q. 395 (1984) which constructs a
typology of moderate and restrictive rent control features and concludes that
legislation enacted since the early seventies is more moderate than previous
years.
29. See supra note 27.
30. The law begins with the statement: "An act in relation to the
regulation, control and stabilization of rents in housing accommodations
during an emergency, creating a temporary state housing rent commission,
prescribing its powers and duties and making an appropriation therefor."
Emergency Housing Rent Control Law, 1946 N.Y. Laws Ch. 274.
31. Achtenberg, The Social Utility of Rent Control, in HOusING URBAN
AMERICA 490 (J. Pynoos, R. Shafer & C. Hartman 2d ed. 1980).
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demand artificially high, controls would create and perpetuate
a constant shortage in rental housing.32
The degree to which an ordinance can be determined to be
restrictive would depend upon how it dealt with such issues as
vacancy decontrol, 3 rent rollbacks to some previous level,
34
condominium conversion restrictions,35 eviction controls,36
and application to new construction.3 7 The most serious criti-
cism levelled against first generation controls (from the lower
income tenants' perspective) was that they caused abandon-
ment of the properties. 8
Critics of rent control argue that the cure is worse than the
disease. 39 In other words the solution to the low-income rental
housing lies not in keeping rents artificially low. The argument
runs that while rent control may have the short-term effect of
keeping rents affordable for some people, it has the longer-
term effect of destroying the housing stock otherwise available
to the low-income tenant. 40 The causes of this destruction
would be owner disinvestment in the property until it is eventu-
32. Walker, Alternatives, in RENT CONTROL, MYTHS AND REALITIES, supra
note 13, at 271-73.
33. Many localities have -vacancy decontrol provisions in their
ordinances. The most common of these provisions allows the landlord of a
controlled unit to charge incoming tenants the market price upon vacancy.
Once the vacated apartment is leased again at the market price, the
apartment will again be subject to controls. Baar, Guidelines for Drafting Rent
Control Laws: Lessons of a Decade, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 723, 826-29 (1983).
34. Rent rollbacks are restrictive features of a rent control ordinance
because their purpose is to fix a base rent while also offsetting rent increases
imposed in anticipation of the ordinance's enactment. Id. at 766.
35. Although varieties of condominium conversion restrictions exist,
the general goal of such provisions seeks to prevent landlords from
subverting the purpose of the ordinance by taking units out of the rental
market. Id. at 835.
36. Eviction controls are restrictive because of the requirement of good
cause justifying the landlord's evictions. Eviction controls become more
necessary where the landlord has a vacancy decontrol provision so that
eviction controls might stifle the landlord's incentive for increased turnover
in unit occupancy. Id. at 833.
37. A lack of a new construction exemption is harsh only in the sense
that it is thought to provide a disincentive for potential landlords. Id. at 835.
38: For authors sympathetic to this argument see Block & Olsen, supra
note 13; but see P. SALINS, THE ECOLOGY OF HOUSING DESTRUCTION 58 (1980)
(pointing out the fact that residential abandonment in New York is
conspicuously confined to slums despite the fact that virtually the entire city
is under some form of rent control).
39. See Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54
BROOKLYN L. REV. 741 (1988).
40. Kiefer, Housing Deterioration, Housing Codes and Rent Control, 17 URB.
STUD. 53, 62 (1980).
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ally unfit for human habitation, at which point the landlord
abandons it altogether.4 1
This argument has force with respect to first generation
controls. If a statute was considered to be restrictive with
respect to the previously mentioned criteria, then an owner
would face unreasonable pressures to cut costs. The argument
has merit, especially because maintenance and repair costs are
at the discretion of the landlord, unlike other fixed costs which
he must pay.42 A landlord can, and often does, choose not to
pay his taxes, resulting in an eventual threat of foreclosure.
But when a landlord chooses not to maintain his property
properly, he destroys the housing stock that might otherwise
have been open to low-income tenants. At its most insidious
extreme, therefore, harsh rent controls contribute to the physi-
cal destruction of low-income housing and prevent construc-
tion of replacement units. Thus, the argument concludes, rent
control not only keeps demand high through artificially low
prices, but also heightens the shortage through a reduction of
the supply. One should note that the argument has less force
with respect to second generation controls.
B. Second Generation Controls
In New York City, the so-called second generation controls
attempted to come to grips with the problem of restrictive first
generation controls. Implicit in such reform was a recognition
of the link between abandonment and rent control.43 The driv-
ing policy goal was to close the rent gap,44 thus ensuring a "fair
return ' 45 for the landlords of controlled properties.
The most attractive feature of a moderate system of con-
trols is the focus on allowing rents to rise in step with costs
annually. Where the annual increases are inadequate, however,
the landlord can obtain an additional percentage increase for
"hardship." 46 Also, the landlord can pass along legitimate cap-
41. Id.
42. Achtenberg, supra note 31, at 468-69.
43. Gupta & Rea, supra note 28, at 395.
44. Rent gap refers to the difference in price between the controlled
versus uncontrolled rent. From the landlord's perspective, therefore, rent
gap measures his loss per unit as a result of imposing controls.
45. A consensus on the definition of a fair rate of return is elusive. For
a good discussion of fair return which proposes a definition see Note,
Rethinking Rent Control: An Analysis of Fair Return, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 617, 640-48
(1981).
46. Hardship provisions are especially necessary where rent increases
according to a set formula such as annual across the board percentage
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ital costs to the tenant. At best, moderate controls of the type
outlined above strive to prevent sharp or erratic increases
which could hurt low-income tenants while acknowledging the
real needs of the landlord who must cover his fixed costs and
receive a fair return.
The debate over whether rent control prevents homeless-
ness depends, in part, on what one considers to be the real
needs of the landlord. Generally speaking, moderate ordi-
nances reflect the understanding that maximizing the land-
lord's cash-flow in light of the restrictions is a legitimate goal.
Therefore, moderate provisions are considered to be vacancy
decontrol, exemption of newly constructed rental units and no
condominium conversion restrictions;47 all of these items
would directly or indirectly increase a landlord's cash-flow in a
rental market subject to controls.
Of course, the more moderate an ordinance, the less relief
from rent burden a tenant will receive. Clearly, rent control
pits the landlord against the tenant by compelling the landlord
to subsidize the tenant's housing costs. The benefits that the
tenant population as a whole receives in both the short and
long terms are less clear. The next section will discuss the
overall efficacy of rent control in light of the landlord-tenant
struggle. To a large extent, rent control is a zero-sum proposi-
tion for both landlords and tenants. While individual tenants
of controlled units stand to gain, rent control affects tenants as
a whole by creating less opportunities for tenant mobility.4 8
C. Rent Control and Homelessness
For political as well as economic reasons, federal policies
should rely on the market to provide housing.4 9 This is not to
suggest that the government should never intervene on behalf
of low-income families facing the spectre of homelessness.
Rent control, even in the moderate form outlined above,
attempts to provide part of the solution. 50 But even staunch
supporters of rent control must concede that it is not designed
increases. Hardship clauses allow greater flexibility in the application of rent
control ordinances. See M. LETr, supra note 26, at 108.
47. See supra notes 33-37.
48. Ault, The Presumed Advantages and Real Disadvantages of Rent Control, in
RENT CONTROL, MYTHS AND REALITIES, supra note 13, at 70.
49. Salins, America's Permanent Housing Problem, in HOUSING AMERICA'S
POOR 12 (P. Salins ed. 1987).
50. For a theoretically persuasive discussion of the efficacy of rent
control in a gentrifying market see Note, Reassessing Rent Control: Its Economic
Impact in a Gentrifying Market, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1835 (1988).
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specifically to alleviate the rent burden of low-income families.
By indiscriminately freezing prices, rent control has only hap-
hazard application to low-income families. Moreover, while
ostensibly containing the power to alleviate rent burden, it may
actually accentuate such difficulties because of its short range
and essentially "adversarial character."51 The problem with
opposing rent control is that it seems to be the most logical
response to situations where rent rises faster than income.5"
But rent control is of dubious help, and should not be touted as
a panacea for the lack of affordable housing facing low-income
families.
Both proponents and opponents of rent control can be
quite vigorous in advocating their positions, oftentimes at the
expense of reason. For instance,
Proponents argue that it will prevent rent-gouging, pro-
tect the poor, reduce mobility, restore equity, and lead to
a more progressive government - without harm to the
housing stock or the housing provider. Opponents reply
that rent control will exaggerate present inequities, dis-
courage investment, reduce the quantity and quality of
housing, interfere with tenant-landlord relationships, and
inhibit community improvement. Proponents will
declare: "The real estate speculators are robbing us
blind, and rent control will put an end to it!" Opponents
will offer the rejoinder, "If you want slums in this city,
rent control will give you just what you want!" Claims
such as these are clearly overstatements of the case and
are at times full of self-serving righteousness. They are
neither well documented as description nor accurate as
predictions. Although each statement seems to have
some truth in it, there seems to be no way to measure
that truth. Moreover, the arguments of either side pass
each other, as proverbial ships in the night. The debate
becomes a hollow clash of extremes, and the results are
an uninformed electorate, rash policy and a divided
community.
53
While room for debate over the efficacy of rent control
exists, such a policy is not specifically designed to promote the
needs of the marginalized, low-income tenants on the verge of
homelessness. Moreover, rent control is inefficient under
51. P. NIEBANCK, supra note 25, at 44-46.
52. Id. at 9.
53. Id. at 106.
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Pareto analysis.54 Clearly; the landlord is left worse off with
rent control than without it.55 Also, no mechanism exists to
provide for a transfer from tenant to landlord where tenant
gains exceed landlord losses. Rent control does not spread the
wealth among all eligible low-income tenants and therefore is
unable to overcome the inequitable distribution of benefits that
it creates.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION: RENTAL ASSISTANCE
The 1970s saw a significant increase in shelter poverty,
and the spiral remains unabated in the 1980s.56 It is precisely
this failure of incomes to keep abreast of rents that pushes low-
income families into the ranks of the homeless. As long as
shelter poverty is on the rise, homeless families will continue to
be with us. The policy question that law-makers should
address is simply one of means-given the fact that we can
identify a particular subgroup of the homeless who are home-
less only for economic reasons, what is the best way to help
them? Policies furthering income maintenance, such as rental
assistance, are effective measures for preventing homelessness
because they address the problem of low incomes directly.57
Federal solutions to the low-income housing problem have
not been consistent.5 8 Additionally, some argue that rent con-
trol and rental assistance work against each other.59 What fol-
lows is a discussion of federal policies aimed at rental
assistance, concluding that these policies ought to be the cen-
terpiece of the federal effort to prevent homelessness among
single-parent, low-income families.
54. Pareto efficiency defines the economic condition whereby no one
person in a given society can be made better off, by reallocating goods and
services, without making someone else worse off. Epstein, supra note 39, at
760.
55. Id.
56. Some argue that America's low-income housing crisis is a function
of low incomes. See Hartman, A Radical Perspective on Housing Reform, in
AMERICA'S HOUSING CRISIS-WHIAT IS TO BE DONE? 8 (C. Hartman ed. 1983).
See also Stegman, The Model: Rent Control in New York City, in P. NIEBANCK, supra
note 25, at 45 (citing facts that indicate that between 1970-81 in New York
City, real rents increased by 12 percent while real income fell by nearly 30
percent). But see Salins, supra note 49, at 7 (asserting that homelessness is
much more a function of the growing number of mentally ill than it is a
housing crisis).
57. Shelter poverty is the phenomenon of increased rent burden. See
supra note 12 and accompanying text.
58. Bendick, Comment, J. AM. PLAN. A. 475 (1985).
59. Tucker, America's Homeless: Victims of Rent Control, BACKGROUNDER 8
(1989).
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A. Federal Experiments With Rental Assistance
In the early 1970s, the federal government began in ear-
nest to shift housing policy away from public production and
toward various forms of individual housing subsidies. 60 In
part, the switch from increasing supply through new construc-
tion to raising demand through income assistance reflected a
recognition that demand-side strategies for solving the low-
income housing problem were more consistent with market
operation and therefore less disruptive.6' Moreover, "tying
subsidy to family rather than [to] dwelling units permits a flexi-
ble response to changing local market conditions."62 The less
regulated a market, the more responsive it should be, theoreti-
cally, to changes in either supply, demand or both. The eco-
nomic argument for rental assistance conveys a certain
confidence in the market's ability to increase supply by increas-
ing demand.
But the argument for rental assistance need not rest on the
model described above. Rather, with or without significant
market effects, rental assistance retards homelessness by reduc-
ing the incidence of shelter poverty. To the extent that low-
income tenants are afforded relief from rent burden, govern-
ment housing policy acts to prevent homelessness.63 While the
government could attempt to increase supply through public
production (which in theory should lead to a price reduction)
history has shown that supply-oriented approaches are more
costly and less efficient than income transfers. 64 Additionally,
rental assistance provides stability in the rental market for two
important reasons. First, increased cash-flow encourages land-
lords to maintain and repair their properties. Rent control not
only stifles this incentive, but could actually force a landlord to
cut back maintenance and repair costs.65 Secondly, housing
allowances further tenant mobility into areas in which they
would otherwise not venture.6 6 Rent control, on the other
hand induces tenants to stay put, causing a range of problems.
60. The federal government began, in earnest, to shift from
construction to rent subsidies with the Housing and Urban Development Act
of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-117, 79 Stat. 451 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12, 15, 38, 40 and 42 U.S.C.).
61. A. SOLOMON, HOUSING THE URBAN POOR 191 (1974).
62. Id. at 185.
63. R. STRUYK & M. BENDICK, supra note 8, at 415; J. FRIEDMAN & D.
WEINBERG, supra note 8, at 7.
64. J. FRIEDMAN & D. WEINBERG, supra note 8, at 142.
65. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
66. See A. SOLOMON, supra note 61, at 186.
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For instance, less mobility invariably means underutilization of
apartments. 67 Thus, many elderly in New York remain in large
apartments long after children have grown and moved out.
Tenants as a whole become locked in, and only those who can
afford the inordinate cost of moving do so. Tenants leaving a
controlled unit will, in all likelihood, face more expensive hous-
ing options. Rental assistance positively influences tenant
mobility because it increases a tenant's ability to buy his way
out of controlled markets.
Several forms of rental assistance exist. Typically rental
assistance provides direct cash either to a landlord or a tenant
for the purpose of rent abatement. 68 In 1970, the federal gov-
ernment augmented the Experimental Housing Allowance Pro-
gram (EHAP).69 EHAP was divided into three experiments:
Demand, Supply and Administrative. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
and Phoenix, Arizona were the sites of the Demand experi-
ment. The purpose was to study the impact of assistance on
consumption demand.7" Green Bay, Wisconsin and South
Bend, Indiana hosted the Supply experiment, which attempted
to determine whether an unrestricted, open-enrollment allow-
ance program would precipitate rent inflation in such mar-
kets. 71 The Administrative experiment, designed to find the
most efficient system for managing the program, involved
many cities and agencies.72 In short, EHAP represents the
largest and most complex social research project ever
conducted.73
EHAP's findings provide many interesting points for dis-
cussing rental assistance, and are less contentious than the
debates surrounding rent control. Although EHAP was not
specifically envisioned as a device to alleviate homelessness, the
EHAP experiment can be readily applied towards preventing
homelessness. For instance, showing that housing allowances
could alleviate the burden of rent for low-income people was
67. C.f Ault, supra note 48, at 70 (author concludes that restrictions on
tenant mobility have other negative consequences such as dampened new
construction).
68. J. FRIEDMAN & D. WEINBERG, supra note 8, at xi.
69. R. STRUYK & M. BENDICK, supra note 8, at xvii. EHAP was started
because of the growing recognition of and political support for income
maintenance as opposed to construction subsidies.
70. Id. at 35.
71. Id. at 38-39.
72. Id. at 40-41.
73. Id. at 295.
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EHAP's single greatest achievement." Moreover, unlike tradi-
tional government housing programs that served moderate and
low-income people together, EHAP was successful in meeting
the needs of the very poor, such as racial minorities, female-
headed households, welfare recipients, large families and the
elderly.75
The current federal rent supplement has also had a mea-
sure of success in this regard.76 Simply stated, rental assistance
enables the otherwise hard to house to compete in tight United
States markets.
B. Existing Allowances: Section 8 77
The federal government began disbursing rent supple-
ments on a small scale in 1965 as part of its War on Poverty
program. 78 The 1974 Housing and Community Development
Act,7 9 however, solidified the shift away from supply-oriented
programs.8" The fact that Section 8 was enacted before the
conclusion of EHAP indicates the very strong political support
behind rental assistance at the time. While Section 8 and
EHAP have marked similarities, significant differences exist
between the two. Chief among them are:
1. A Section 8 household cannot participate in the pro-
gram if such a unit costs more than the "fair market
rent" (FMR). FMR is the HUD established price for a
given unit. EHAP had no such restrictions. Thus,
Section 8 tenants are more limited in terms of choice.
2. With Section 8 the landlord receives a voucher repre-
senting the difference between FMR and the tenant's
ability to pay, whereas with EHAP the tenant receives
the benefits directly.
3. Finally, Section 8 and EHAP differed significantly in
determining income eligibility.8 '
74. Frieden, Housing Allowances: An Experiment that Worked, 54 PUB.
INTEREST 15, 24 (1980).
75. Id. at 23.
76. Id.
77. HUD Act of 1965 created the rent supplement program and the
Section 23 Leased Housing Program. Both were revised by the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 12, 20, 40, 42 and 48 U.S.C.),
and are commonly known as "Section 8 Existing."
78. See supra note 77.
79. Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5, 12, 20, 40, 42 and 48 U.S.C.).
80. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
81. R. STRUYK & M. BENDICK, supra note 8, at 33.
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These differences have direct consequences for the extent
to which assistance can help prevent homelessness. Specifi-
cally, evidence suggests that Section 8's FMR provision actually
acts as a rent inflation and not a rent control provision. 2
Implicit in the FMR rent ceiling is the government's willingness
to pay up to the FMR. Therefore, landlords have every incen-
tive to charge at least the maximum the government allows,
and sometimes beyond, where authorized." Yet EHAP, which
had no similar rent ceiling, encountered no problems of rent
inflation.84
Current economic wisdom would suggest that large
increases in demand for a given product must lead to inflation,
absent other market interferences. But EHAP's Supply experi-
ment, designed precisely to measure the market's reaction to
substantial increases in effective housing demand, showed no
such feared inflation over the first years of the experiment's
operation. 5 Thus, housing allowances are not vulnerable to
the most serious criticism levelled against rent control:
namely, that the cure is worse than the disease. Housing
allowances are structured to alleviate rent burdens. If such
assistance contributed to price inflation, then it would amount
to a very costly government entitlement with minimal effective-
ness. But the facts do not support such conclusions. And, to
those who evaluated it "Section 8 was a well structured and
successful program."'8 6 By successfully targeting the poor, Sec-
tion 8 represents a potentially vital weapon in the govern-
ment's arsenal for preventing homelessness.
82. Khadduri & Struyk, Improving Section 8 Rental Assistance, 5
EVALUATION REV. 197 (1981).
83. Id. at 196.
84. Id.
85. R. STRUYK & M. BENDICK, supra note 8, at 221.
86. Khadduri & Struyk, supra note 82, at 201.
87. The Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1981,
Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 384-431 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12, 40 and 42 U.S.C.), requires families under federally
administered rental assistance to pay up to 30 percent of their income on rent
instead of the previous 25 percent. However, this revision ignores the very
real problem of shelter poverty and rent burden discussed supra note 12. In
fact, the amendment only increases the hardship many families face. From
1981-87, the Reagan Administration slashed HUD's budget from $32 billion
a year to just over $7.12 billion a year. Statistics provided by the NATIONAL
COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA: A SUMMARY, at 2
(1988).
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V. POLICY PROPOSALS
The current HUD requirement that only those households
paying at least 30 percent of their incomes on rent can be eligi-
ble for Section 8 is too high. Congress should lower this figure
to 25 percent, the original standard.88 Also, HUD should elim-
inate FMR ceilings in its rental assistance package. As argued,
this provision is a failure as a rent cap and even has a tendency
to cause rent inflation. Additionally, the federal government
should continue the trend begun twenty years ago towards rent
assistance and away from housing construction. Public money
is too scarce for it to be devoted to the public production of
housing. The recently revealed HUD scandals including
patronage and kick-backs with new construction contracts
underscore the potential for abuse in public production. The
private market does a better job at producing housing units,
and rent assistance can potentially reach more persons than
public housing. Finally, HUD should undertake a detailed
review of current housing standards with a view towards
streamlining current standards to include only essential health
and safety concerns.89 This opening-up of the requirements
would allow program recipients a wider range of housing
opportunities, thereby increasing their chances of finding a
decent apartment.
The proposals are modest revisions of existing federal
housing law that are practical and attainable. By simplifying
the housing code and relying, in earnest, on demand-side strat-
egies, the federal government would give a major impetus to
rental assistance and the fight against homelessness. By reduc-
ing the eligibility standard to 25% and restoring recent cuts,
the federal government can make major inroads towards
preventing homelessness among single-parent low-income
families.
VI. CONCLUSION
Homelessness is a major problem in the United States.
Many large cities in the United States have a serious homeless-
ness problem.9 ° Moreover, since the late 1970s, the composi-
tion of the homeless has changed dramatically: from white to
88. See supra note 87.
89. Carliner, Homelessness-A Housing Problem?, in HOMELESSNESS IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 127-28 (R. Bingham, R. Green & S. White eds.
1987).
90. See NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 87.
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black, older to younger and from individual to family. 9' The
presence of women with children in the shelters and on the
streets is growing. In fact, such a subgroup is the fastest grow-
ing population among the homeless and conservative estimates
put them at 20 percent.9 2 Also, other facts suggest that single-
parent, female-headed households are in for a rough future
absent increased assistance. For instance, some argue that no-
fault divorce laws in 48 states have materially affected socioeco-
nomic status of women in the U.S.A.9 3 In addition, from 1970-
1984 the number of female-headed households grew by 74 per-
cent and from 1970-1982, the number of children with
divorced mothers doubled.9 4 Moreover, in 1984, two out of
every three poor adults in the United States were women- the
phenomenon known as the feminization of poverty - and one
out of every five children lived under the poverty line.95 Cuts
in the Section 8 housing program during the 1980s have only
heightened the threat of homelessness for many.
The problem of homelessness among families is not intrac-
table. Solutions must address the problem directly. Rental
assistance payments address the problem of shelter poverty
directly. Rent control does not. For those families marginal-
ized and facing the threat of homelessness for solely economic
reasons, Section 8 rental assistance payments could be the one
factor keeping them off the streets and out of the shelters.
91. Sullivan & Damrasch, Homeless Women and Children, in
HOMELESSNESS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY, supra note 89, at 81.
92. Stefl, The New Homeless, in HOMELESSNESS IN CONTEMPORARY
SOCIETY, supra note 89, at 46.
93. Sullivan & Damrasch, supra note 91, at 85.
94. Id. at 83.
95. Id. at 91.
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